Clever Geek Handbook

Automatizar la búsqueda de secretos en git y ansible

¿Sabes qué está almacenado en tu repositorio de git? Entre los cientos de confirmaciones, ¿hay contraseñas de servidores de productos que llegaron allí por error?





Pero, ¿qué pasa si el script ansible falla al publicar y resalta las contraseñas en el registro?





Les contaré cómo intentamos automatizar dichos controles y qué resultó de ellos.





¡Hola, Habr!

Mi nombre es Oleg, trabajo en un banco bastante grande para la Federación de Rusia, en la división de TI para TI.





  (OPS)  (ansible)   . 





2 git ( , ), , , , OPS .





,   master  OPS. 





? git    ( ) OPS. Jenkins git - ( ) OPS.





git? ?





, . secret management,  HashiCorp Vault, CyberArk Conjur .





, .





, pull request .





, !





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3 , :





 





---
    dev_ssh_username1: "admin"
    dev_ssh_password1: "admin123"

- .









shell command ansible





- name: Deploy
  hosts: all
  tasks:
    - name: Update
      shell: "update.sh --user={{ update_user }} --password={{ update_password }}"

, playbook -v .





$ ansible-playbook deploy.yml -i env/DEV/hosts -v
TASK [Update] ******************************************************************
changed: [192.168.1.2] => {"changed": true, "cmd": "/home/dev/update.sh --user=secret_user --password=secret_password", "delta": "0:00:05.056532", "end": "2020-11-06 09:53:09.397355", "rc": 0, "start": "2020-11-06 09:53:04.340823", "stderr": "", "stderr_lines": [], "stdout": "Update SUCCESS", "stdout_lines": ["Update SUCCESS"]}

, playbook ( -v)





$ ansible-playbook deploy.yml -i env/DEV/hosts
TASK [Update] ******************************************************************
fatal: [192.168.1.2]: FAILED! => {"changed": true, "cmd": "/home/dev/update.sh --user=secret_user --password=secret_password", "delta": "0:00:00.018710", "end": "2020-11-06 10:14:30.642419", "msg": "non-zero return code", "rc": 127, "start": "2020-11-06 10:14:30.623709", "stderr": "/bin/sh: /home/dev/update.sh:     ", "stderr_lines": ["/bin/sh: /home/dev/update.sh:     "], "stdout": "", "stdout_lines": []}

  environment, :





- name: Deploy
  hosts: all
  tasks:
    - name: Update
      shell: "/home/dev/update.sh $AUTH_DATA"
      environment:
        AUTH_DATA: "--user={{ update_user }} --password={{ update_password }}"

credentials . no_log.









withCredentials





Jenkins, credentials  withCredentials. pipeline credential, , . Jenkins .





, , :





node {
  stage('Jenkins Credentials | Decrypt Secret File') {
    withCredentials([file(credentialsId: 'credentials-id', variable: 'secretFile')]) {
      sh 'cat $secretFile'
    }
  }
}

, , . ,  secretFile  withCredentials.











, . ( ).





.  SonarQube   Checkmarx. .





- SonarQube Hard-coded credentials are security-sensitive





, . ,  .





C Checkmarx - . ( Application Security ). , :





import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.ResponseBody;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
 
@RestController
public class DemoController {
    @RequestMapping("/show_me_creds")
    public @ResponseBody String show_me_creds() {
        String thisIsMyLittleSecret = "qwerty12345";
        return thisIsMyLittleSecret;
    }
}

opensource . google "find secrets in git" :





Gitleaks, :





  • regexp, ;





  • ;





  • json;





  • ;





  • .





- toml , : 





[[rules]]
  description = "generic secret regex"
  regex = '''secret(.{0,20})([0-9a-zA-Z-._{}$\/\+=]{20,120})'''
  tags = ["secret", "example"]

, : 





[[rules]]
  description = "entropy and regex example"
  regex = '''secret(.{0,20})([0-9a-zA-Z-._{}$\/\+=]{20,120})'''
  [[rules.Entropies]]
    Min = "4.5"
    Max = "4.7"

: " , ,    4,5 4,7, "





,  .





:





➜  ~  gitleaks --repo=gitleaks --repo=https://github.com/gitleakstest/gronit.git --verbose --pretty
INFO[2020-04-28T13:00:34-04:00] cloning... https://github.com/gitleakstest/gronit.git
Enumerating objects: 135, done.
Total 135 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 135
{
        "line": "const AWS_KEY = \"AKIALALEMEL33243OLIAE\"",
        "offender": "AKIALALEMEL33243OLIA",
        "commit": "eaeffdc65b4c73ccb67e75d96bd8743be2c85973",
        "repo": "gronit.git",
        "rule": "AWS Manager ID",
        "commitMessage": "remove fake key",
        "author": "Zachary Rice",
        "email": "zricethezav@users.noreply.github.com",
        "file": "main.go",
        "date": "2018-02-04T19:43:28-06:00",
        "tags": "key, AWS"
}
...
...
WARN[2020-04-28T13:00:35-04:00] 6 leaks detected. 33 commits audited in 77 milliseconds 738 microseconds

, gitleaks - .





- whitelist , :





[[rules]]
  description = "entropy and regex example"
  regex = '''secret(.{0,20})['|"]([0-9a-zA-Z-._{}$\/\+=]{20,120})['|"]'''
  [[rules.Entropies]]
    Min = "4.5"
    Max = "4.7"
  [[rules.whitelist]]
    regex = '''secret.some_value_that_match_regexp_but_not_really_a_secret'''
    description = "ignore that string"

- pull request webhook Jenkins, , gitleaks - NEED WORK.





, , gitleaks ( ). 





ansible

, , playbook, Jenkins .





- name: Deploy
  hosts: all
  tasks:
    - name: Update
      shell: "update.sh --user={{ update_user }} --password={{ update_password }}"

ansible - , OPA (      ), python.





,  Ansible Lint.





Ansible, " " , .





2 :





  • ;





  • playbook. , . 





- python , id, short description, description tags ( Ansible Lint ) match matchtask, .   .





matchtask, task, . 





, ( ):





class CommandsInsteadOfModulesRule(AnsibleLintRule):
    id = '303'
    shortdesc = 'Using command rather than module'
    description = (
        'Executing a command when there is an Ansible module '
        'is generally a bad idea'
    )
    severity = 'HIGH'
    tags = ['command-shell', 'resources', 'ANSIBLE0006']
 
    _commands = ['command', 'shell']
    _modules = {
        'apt-get': 'apt-get',
# ,    
        'yum': 'yum',
    }
 
    def matchtask(self, file, task):
        if task['action']['__ansible_module__'] not in self._commands:
            return
 
        first_cmd_arg = get_first_cmd_arg(task)
        if not first_cmd_arg:
            return
 
        executable = os.path.basename(first_cmd_arg)
        if executable in self._modules and \
                boolean(task['action'].get('warn', True)):
            message = '{0} used in place of {1} module'
            return message.format(executable, self._modules[executable])

- task command shell  _modules - .





- (password/pass/login ) command shell . 





no_log, . no_log - .





, Gitleaks Ansible Lint, . , .. ( ).





withCredentials

, Jenkinsfile , ( ).





node {
  stage('Jenkins Credentials | Decrypt Secret File') {
    withCredentials([file(credentialsId: 'credentials-id', variable: 'secretFile')]) {
      sh 'cat $secretFile'
    }
  }
}

.





Jenkinsfile groovy,  Abstract Syntax Tree  .   AstBuilder  ,  withCredentials, withCredentials. , .





,   secretFile - stage,  secretFile . 





1000 , ,   .





, pipeline  Pipeline model definition plugin, pipeline json . - .





?

, 1000 pull request. 3% gitleaks, , ansible.





, OPS .





, :





  • https://nightfall.ai/resources/introducing-radar-api-detect-credentials-secrets-in-code-via-machine-learning/ - . - ?





  • https://www.shellcheck.net/ - shell .





  • https://github.com/PyCQA/bandit - security linter python.





  • https://twitter.com/leak_scavenger  es solo un interesante bot de Twitter que escanea github, pastebin, ghostbin en busca de secretos, tarjetas de crédito, claves privadas, etc. Por supuesto, las fuentes están disponibles.











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